States or any territory under its control or jurisdiction, contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of any such narcotic drug after being imported or brought into the United States contrary to law, or conspires to commit any of such acts in violation of the laws of the United States shall be imprisoned not less than 5 nor more than 20 years, and, in addition, may be fined not more than $20,000.2 ' The key enforcement provision, as well as the subject of this article, is the following statutory presumption:
"Whenever on trial for a violation of this section the defendant is shown to have or to have had possession of the narcotic drug, such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains the possession to the satisfaction of the jury." 6 An identical presumption flows from the possession of marihuana, 7 heroin, 8 and smoking opium in transit In addition, all smoking opium is rebuttably presumed to be illegally imported, 0 and anyone who manufactures opium products has the burden of proving a license to do so." A presumption similar to that of the Jones-Miller Act flows from possession of narcotics in any form other than in the original tax-stamped package, in order to facilitate enforcement of the Harrison Act.u Some insight into the intended effect of this pre-sumption is provided by its legislative history. It was first drafted on July 7, 1866 by a conference committee convened to settle differences between House and Senate bills, both entitled "An Act Further to Prevent Smuggling and for Other Purposes."" 3 The original bill 4 had instructed that "the burden of proof shall be upon the claimant where probable cause is shown for such prosecution, to be judged by the court."' 5 This was interpreted by its critics to violate the traditional presumption of innocence in all criminal prosecutions by authorizing the direction of a guilty verdict upon mere proof of suspicious circumstances (probable cause).Xe Proponents of this shift in the burden of proof replied that conviction by operation of law was justified by the necessities of effective law enforcement, for skillful defense counsel might require the government to prove the impossible,
i.e., an illegal source or knowledge of the same, and jury convictions based on circumstantial evidence would be too infrequent. 7 Nevertheless, an amendment striking out the provision was passed,"' a presumption substantially identical to that under consideration was drafted and approved, 19 and it was enacted on July 17, 1866.
2 " Although at least one voice objected to this alleged presumption of guilt from possession, its insertion into the 1909 Act was approved without serious consideration."
II. OPERATIVE EFFECT OF T PRESUMPTION
Prior to a discussion of the effect of this presumption, it should be noted that the source of Congressional authority for narcotics regulation under the Jones-Miller Act is its power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce.n Likewise, the constitutional source of the Harrison Act is the tax power." But Congress may not legislate for the general welfare, as by prescribing the mislabelling of drugs not in interstate commerce; 24 nor may it infringe the police power of the states by making mere " CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3501 (1866).
14 Sen. 222.
" CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3420. The essential elements of the crime charged by a Jones-Miller prosecution are: (1) participation in some manner in a transaction involving narcotics; (2) unlawful importation of the narcotics; (3) defendant's knowledge of such illegal source." Proof of all three components is necessary for the establishment of a prima facie case. The provision in question creates either a double presumption of illegal importation and knowledge of the same," or a single presumption that one in possession has performed every element of the crime." This presumption is rebuttable and permissive, since its primary effect is to carry the case to the jury and to allow them to convict if they so choose. Moreover, the presumption of innocence operates in a defendant's favor until overcome by proof of " United States v. Ah Hung, 243 Fed. 762, 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1917) : "The charge of unlawful importation is therefore necessary to take the case out of the ordinary police regulation of a state." See also the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Butler in Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 426 (1928) : "Mere purchase or possession of morphine is not a crime. Congress has not attempted and has no power to make either an offense..." The majority, upholding the validity of the Harrison Act, did not contradict this latter statement, but found that possession justified an inference of violation of the tax provisions. See also United States v. Jim Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394 (1916) .
2" Griego v. United States, 298 F.2d 845, 848 (10th Cir. 1962) .
VIbid.
2 Copperthwaite v. United States, 37 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1930); Comment, Narcotics Regudation, 62 YALE L. J. 751, 768 (1953 REv. 178, 198 (1931); Comment, 38 MicH. L. REv. 366, 369 (1940) . Professor Brosman bases this conclusion on the notion that the jury may always refuse to convict unless the prosecution has proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as well as the fact that the defendant is protected from a directed verdict and actual compulsion to testify. Id. at 197. Professor Glanville Williams, however, would call such a presumption of law which requires the accused to prove a specific issue to the satisfaction of the jury, a "compelling presumption," if it shifts the burden of persuasion. ' Thus, the presumption merely shifts the burden of going forward, rather than the burden of persuasion,n and prescribes a rule of evidence rather than one of substantive law.-Nor is the prosecution relieved of its burden of proving guilt.
3 4 The prosecution can, however, fulfill its burden with circumstantial evidence, i.e. facts from which the jury may reasonably infer guilt.
3
" The presumption merely tells the jury that the fact proved is sufficient circumstantial evidence to authorize conviction.
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It manifests legislative approval of a jury's finding that one fact exists when another is proved, and assures that, if the proved fact exists, the verdict will stand.n Since the accused remains immune from a directed verdict, he may not be seriously disadvantaged when ordinary reasonable inferences sufficient to support conviction are regularized into a statutory presumption.P Indeed, such a presumption may benefit the unwary defendant by notifying him of the circumstances which raise sufficient suspicion in order that he may come forward and reconcile such circumstances with innocence.n Where, then, lies the great administrative value of this presumption which has induced its frequent legislative adoption? First, it insulates the prosecution from a directed verdict when elements of its prima facie case, i.e. illegal importation and knowledge of such source, are extremely difficult of proof.
4 0 Also, it may erase doubts of a jury as to 31 Ng Choy Fong v. United States, 245 Fed. 305, (9th Cir. 1917) , cert. denied, 245 U.S. 669 (1918); Shepard v. United States. 236 Fed. 73 (9th Cir. 1916 42 both by emphasizing the fact proved and its probable consequences, and by the very fact that the legislature saw fit to enact the rule. Additionally, it permits convictions to stand which might otherwise be reversed for insufficient evidence, since the court cannot set aside a verdict if the presumption is operative. 43 Finally, the degree of difficulty of rebuttal of the presumption may dictate the frequency of convictions."
In order to effectively rebut this "presumption of guilt, ' 45 a defendant need only, in theory, satisfy the jury that either (1) the narcotics in question were not illegally imported, or (2) that he had no knowledge of that fact. He is not required to take the stand to deny knowledge and submit to a test of credibility. 1 If this were necessary, it might violate the privilege of the accused against self-incrimination since the inherent inference of guilt flowing from his silence would induce him either to incriminate or perjure himself. Nor should the defendant be forced to rely exclusively on the former method of defense by proving that his possession was lawful, though the cases here are in conflict.e This requirement would be impossible to satisfy where either the narcotics were contraband or defendant-was a mere tool and REv. 291, 302-03 (1927) . Professor McCormick doubts that the ordinary jury could systematically weigh the circumstantial evidence of guilt against the presumption of innocence resulting in the reasonable doubt standard when judges have such great difficulty in such cases; the presumption and instruction thereon alleviates this mystery to a great degree. Further evidence that "possession lawful under the statute" did not include innocent possession is provided by United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1945 ). There the court followed its dictum in Hoe Liss by refusing to require disclosure of the names of informers establishing defendant's possession. Although, arguably, the informer's testimony could aid in establishing the credibility of defendant's denial of knowledge, such disclosure was held valueless to defendant since the fact of possession "left him with the burden of coming forward with proof that he possessed the narcotics lawfully." Id. at 652. Accord, United States v. Feinberg. 123 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1941 Although a defendant need not prove lawful possession, his explanation of possession or denial of knowledge must be believed by the jury, whose finding is accorded much weight. Thus, where defendant's operations were suspicious,N or his testimony contradicted,N convictions were affirmed notwithstanding pleas of ignorance. Although the statutory presumption may vanish upon the production of rebuttal evidence, a valid inference may remain based on the circumstantial force of the facts proved. 5 5 The jury may, and often does, disbelieve the defendant's denial; though he has met his burden of going forward, the jury draws logical inferences from the fact of possession.
5 6 Moreover, the standard of credibility is high.7 From this point of view, the presumption itself is not given evidential value; rather the fact proved is accorded such effect.-It is uncertain, however, that in each instance of conviction despite attempted rebuttal, the jury the fact of violation of "public welfare" offenses, i.e. liquor laws, pure food and drug laws, traffic laws, the severity of the penalty in these narcotics prosecutions (twenty years imprisonment plus $20,000 fine) resists their classification with that sphere in which inens rea is no longer necessary. See Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 CoL. L. REv. 55, 70-72 (1933 [Vol. 57 is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused actually knew that the narcotics had been illegally imported." It is probable that many narcotics offenders can testify truthfully that they had no knowledge of unlawful importation, for they were not concerned with the primary source of the narcotics.
0 Conviction of such intermediaries would be impossible under a literal reading of the statute, but is authorized by judicial expansion of "knowledge" to include "willful ignorance."'" A narrow construction would limit the force of the statute to primary sources of import traffic and is unsupported by the broad purpose of the act as manifested by its comprehensive language.62 Though the greater the difficulty of rebuttal, the more often possession itself is punished,O the result of this construction is merely a partial relaxation of the mens rea requirement. The court in Casey, supra, also upheld the Harrison Act provision that possession was prima facie evidence clusion is that, when a rational connection exists between the fact proved and those presumed," s the federal jurisdictional facts, i.e. unlawful importation and knowledge, can be established by circumstantial evidence."
' Since the presumption is not conclusive, 70 Congress has not exceeded the bounds of its. authority by declaring mere possession to be criminal n There is no violation of defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, for assuming the aforementioned rational connection, he is no more compelled to testify than he would be in the absence of the presumption and the presence of a circumstantial prima facie case.
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Notwithstanding that the general failure of rebuttals based on independent evidence" may create an actual compulsion for the accused to testify, this result is not clearly traceable to the presumption. 74 Nor is there an infringement of the presumption of innocence since that presumption may be overcome by circumstantial evidence." There is no curtailment of the jury trial guarantee, for judicial or legislative authorization to convict, like an instruction on the burden of proof, still permits the jury to make the ultimate decisionY1 Finally, careful instruction to the jury of of a purchase within the jurisdiction, thus establishing the venue of the federal court. See also 18 U.S.C., §3237, laying venue wherever the unlawful act was begun, completed or continued. 6 8 To meet this standard, the fact proved must render the inference more probable than not, rather than merely tend to prove the fact to be established. 844 (1948) . This argument appears untenable in view of (1) the lack of express prohibition against a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, (2) the judicial alternative of disclaiming the operative fact of possession as a matter of law, and (3) the traditional view that the jury should weigh the evidence. Although judges may be more logical, the inferences in question are so interrelated to the facts found, that judicial appraisal of circumstantial evidence is no more desirable than in the case of direct evidence. 77 That some instruction is necessary, see n. 41, supra. is here inapplicable because Congress has no power to punish upon proof of the operative factN hence it cannot exercise legislative grace by permitting the accused to exculpate himself by rebutting the presumption. Although Wigmore has attacked the rational connection requirement as improper judicial interference with legislative discretion, 85 and McCormick would sustain a statutory presumption on either of the three foregoing tests, 86 the broad influence of the instant presumption, as manifested by the difficulty of rebuttal, seems to require, at least, the safeguard provided by the rational connection requirement.
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IV. THE OPERATIvE FACT Implementation of this safeguard cannot be achieved on a general plane because there obviously is a rational connection between possession on the one hand, and unlawful importation and scienter, as judicially construed,3 on the other. Also, if defendants are to be protected at all, it must be before the presumption becomes operative; beyond that point they are at the mercy of a jury conditioned by the presumption. This would suggest careful judicial definition of the operative fact, possession, as well as dose scrutiny of the rational connection in each case. Reasonable inferences, both of unlawful importation and knowledge thereof, drawn from the circumstances should be prerequisite to a finding of possession.9
Since possession is not an essential element of the crime, convictions may be supported by independent evidence, direct or circumstantial, 9° of "That the narcotic drug is that type which is prohibited can be proved (a) by testimony relating to the substance itself, such as color analysis, etc., or (b) by testimony as to the surrounding circumstances, or (c) by reliance on the statutory presumption arising from proof of possession." [Vol. 57 participation in the prescribed act, unlawful importation and knowledge thereof.
9 ' Nor does actual possession, in the ordinary sense of the word, automatically activate the presumption; possession must be consciousn and of sufficient duration to manifest control over the narcotics, 93 States v. Barrington, supra n. 92, tinguished Santore on the ground that momentary possession was accompanied by other incriminating circumstances, i.e. defendant's addiction, past participation in narcotics transaction, and use of narcotics jargon in reference to the package in his possession. In United States v. Gregory, supra n. 89, defendant Sumpter's conviction was affirmed although his only contact with the narcotics was to receive the package from his automobile companion and immediately dispose of it through the window, because the court found his action motivated by his recognition of approaching federal agents.
Santore may be criticized for failing to properly evaluate the incriminating circumstance of Narducci's immediate disposal of the package. Would one without knowledge of the contraband nature of the package have acted so suspiciously? Gregory seems justified on the grounds that if the accused had recognized the officers, his actions manifested guilty knowledge; if his disposal of the package were the innocent act of an agent directed by his principal, he could have so testified. As in the case of joint tortfeasors, such allocation of responsibility is much more readily shown by the defense. 14 See n. 89 supra, and accompanying text. 95 Hernandez v. United States, 300 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1962) . Such "constructive possession" applies to a defendant who has sufficient dominion and control over the narcotics to direct their possession. This doctrine is though proof of dominion and control over property on which narcotics are found is a strong circumstance tending to prove constructive possession, mere ownership of such property, especially when another has more immediate possession, 96 or mere proximity to the drug or association with one who controls the property on which it is found,w is insufficient.
It is obvious from the foregoing discusssion that circumstantial evidence, i.e., other incriminating circumstances, is useful in determining when it is reasonable to ask the accused to explain his possession. Circumstantial evidence may also prove the fact of actual" or constructive" possession. The availability of such evidence may justified by a judicial imputation to Congress of an intention to "avoid freeing the principal who does not have manual possession while punishing the agent who does." Id. at 118. Such principals are more likely to have the capacity to explain the source of the narcotics than the agents in possession.
96 Jackson v. United States, 250 F.2d 772 (D.C.Cir. 1957). (conviction reversed when only proof of possession was defendant's possession of key to his nephew's room in which narcotics were found hidden in a television set).
Cf. United States v. Landry, 257 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1958), reversing a conviction when defendant merely claimed ownership of heroin found in actual possession of another. Although Congress has indeed made "possession" and not "ownership" the operative fact, this decision seems somewhat inconsistent with the "constructive possession" rationale which seeks to punish the principal who has actual control rather than the agent. Any justification derived from the fact that the physical possessor may explain his possession by mere reference to the owner is weakened by the improbability that such explanation will be accepted as exculpatory. See, e.g. United States v. Norton, 310 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1962) , and n. 44, supra. States v. Chiarelli, 192 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1952 ), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952 ; United States v. Pisano, 193 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1951) . Although such evidence is reliable as to the fact that the accused touched the package, it becomes less reliable in view of the facts that the package may have contained a different substance at the time of contact, and defendant is likely to have more difficulty recalling when and why he made contact than if he were caught in actual possession. permit the government to use trained anonymous informers, 1 0 though some limitations on this practice are necessary to insure the accused a fair opportunity to rebut the presumption.' 0 '
Although the propriety of this use of circumstantial evidence to prove the operative fact of a statutory presumption has been attacked as basing an inference on an inference, 02 this criticism is relevant only if circumstantial evidence is inherently less reliable than direct evidence. 02 The latter proposition is countered by the ordinary difficulties, e.g., honesty and memory of witnesses, intrinsic to the direct evidence method of proof. 0 4 For the same reason, the circumstantial evidence test for appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence, which requires that all circumstances be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, has been replaced in some federal courts by the traditional substantial evidence test.'
The functional significance of the permissibility of proving actual possession by means of circumstantial evidence has been somewhat overshadowed 100 See, e.g., Dear Check Quong v. United States, 160 F.2d 251 (D.C.Cir. 1947) , in which the testimony of an informer who purchased narcotics from defendant was unnecessary because the informer was searched immediately before and after the transaction and the officers could testify as to the exchange of narcotics for government funds and sole contact during the period of exchange with the accused. No explanation of the possession so proved was attempted.
101 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1956) held that the government must, if requested, disclose the identity of undercover informers who participated in proving possession:
"The fact that petitioner here was faced with the burden of explaining or justifying his alleged possession of the heroin emphasizes his vital need for access to any material witness. Otherwise the burden of going forvard might become unduly heavy. by the doctrine of constructive possession. Based as it is on the judicial implementation of an imputed legislative purpose to punish the leaders of criminal operations, 0 6 the doctrine compels the conclusion not only that possession need neither be immediate nor exclusive. 0 7 but also that actual physical custody is not required. Santore, supra n. 93 at 70-71, attacking this statutory construction. True, Congress could have expressly included constructive possession as an operative fact; yet it seems unlikely that it would choose to castigate the "tools" rather than the "minds" of criminal activity. The legislative history is unrevealing. See also 110 U. PA. L. REv. 903, 907-08 (1962) .
107 Brown v. United States, 222 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1955 ). See n. 97, supra.
100 It should be noted that one in constructive possession has the power to determine physical custody and could, at any time, have been in actual possession. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 277 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1960) where the finding of possession sufficient to activate the presumption was based on the defendant's negotiations with the purchaser/federal agent and his direction to the cache of narcotics. Defendant might have placed the package himself or directed another to do so. Some however, such as (2), capacity to set the terms of the transaction, (4) (a), capacity to assure the quality of the drug, and (5) (b), ultimate custody of the proceeds, are especially significant, because they are generally associated with the principals of the enterprise."' With the doctrinal objectivein and the problems arising from organized criminal enterprise, 13 dearly in focus, the Second Circuit has, in United States v. Hernandez,'" adopted a test of constructive possession which requires that the accused have such a relationship with one having physical custody of the narcotics as to be able to assure their delivery as a matter of course." 5 This test thus liberates from the statutory burden of explanation those casual facilitators whose association with the criminal enterprise is so tenuous that they may have no knowledge, actual or constructive, of the source of the narcotics."
Cf
6 It also appears to codify the aforementioned factors of constructive possession as relevant both to the power of the accused to produce the drugs and the degree of facility with which he can do so. But see United States v. Jones, 308 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1962 ) reversing a finding of constructive possession when the accused merely introduced the contracting parties and received payment for such service as an intermediary; he was expressly to be excluded from future transactions.
"'Thus, Cellino, supra n. 98, may be criticized as ensnaring a mere casual facilitator. 110 U. PA. L. REv. 903, 907 (1962) . The accused therein was no more actively involved than the defendant in Jones, supra n. 110 for purposes of activating the presumption. The attempted distinction on the ground that the former defendant had warranted the seller's reliability fails because of the lack of rational connection of this fact to illegal source of the drugs and scienter. Any agent, ignorant of the source, could praise his principal. See 31 FoRD. L. PEv. 821, 823 (1963) .
The results in the cases cited in n. 110, supra generally are preserved. Cellino, supra n. 98, and Lucero, supra n. 110, are possible exceptions since neither defendant had the power to produce narcotics as a matter of course. The latter case can be so read only if Another interesting problem is presented when the accused is a participant in a transaction in which another has actual or constructive possession of the narcotics. Since conspirators are criminally liable for all acts within the common purpose of the conspiracy,"' and aiders and abettors are treated not as facilitators, but under a separate statute,S it has been stated that the possession of one party may be attributed to the conspirator, aider or abettor,"' in order to activate the presumption. Although this proposition has received some judicial approval, it has never been accepted as the sole basis for decision."' The Second Circuit was evenly divided on this question in United States vs. Santore,m but has ultimately required independent proof of possession in order to activate the presumption against an aider and abettor in United States v. Jones. m The Ninth Circuit had reached the same conclusion in Hernandez v. United States, 124 on the strength of reasoning suggested in Santore 12 5 to the effect that the scienter required of a principal 26 who is an aider and abettor may not be proved by attribution of possession, for that would presume the fact to be proved, i.e., that he was an aider and abettor."' Moreover, the theory behind the presumption contradicts such an attribution, for an aider and abettor is not only not the party best able to explain the source of the narcotics, but he would, in addition, be required to justify the possession of another." 8 A defendant might even be convicted as an aider and abettor to the commission of a substantive offense when no such offense had in fact been committed for the absent principal in possession might be able to satisfy the jury. Hernandez v. United States, supra n. 124 at 123. The court also noted: "It would be anomalous indeed if proof of a common scheme or plan, admittedly insufficient to constitute a conspiracy violative of sec. 174 because proof of the requisite specific knowledge was lacking, could nonetheless provide the basis for imputing the same specific knowledge for the purposes of conviction of the substantive offenses under the same statute." Id. at 121.
See also 31 Fore. L. REV. 821, 824 (1963) ; 110 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 906 (1962) .
128 United States v. Jones, supra n. 110 at 33; 31 FoRn. L. REv. 824, 825 (1963) .
"8 Hernandez v. United States, United States v. Jones, supra n. 110 at 33. frequently impose an impossible burden," 3 0 permitting the jury to infer guilt from, not even possession, but mere association with a criminal enterprise. The necessity for proof of the facts on which federal jurisdiction is based would then be obviated and the constitutional limitations ignored.
31
V. CONCLUSION Although the statutory presumption as a rule of evidence merely regularizes reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances of narcotics transactions, it has great practical value in federal prosecutions. The broad discretion lodged in the jury with legislative authorization to convict upon a finding of possession, may, if unrestricted by the rational connection requirement, result in the unauthorized creation of a federal crime of possession. However, since the general validity of the presumption is well-settled, and the legislative delegation to the jury is dear, judicial controls must be exerted by ad hoc review of the presence of the operative fact, possession. Consistent with the imputed legislative intent, the presumption should be activated only against a defendant when the circumstances indicate that he either knows or has willfully ignored the source of the narcotics. This theoretical objective should determine the limits of the doctrine of constructive possession. It should also serve as a point of reference in the resolution of all criminal problems arising under the presumption.
